This paper develops a new class of measures of mobility as an equalizer of longerterm incomes -a concept different from other notions such as mobility as an equalizer of opportunity, mobility as time-independence, positional movement, share movement, income flux, and directional income movement. A set of axioms is specified leading to a class of indices, one easily-implementable member of which is applied to data for the United States and France. Income mobility is found to have equalized longer-term earnings among U.S. men in the 1970s but not in the 1980s or 1990s. In France, though, income mobility was equalizing throughout.
P. Jenkins (1998) put it thus: "To some people, greater inequality at a point in time is more tolerable if accompanied by significant mobility; mobility smoothes transitory variations in income so that 'permanent' inequality is less than observed inequality."
What unites all of the preceding statements is a concern with income mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes along with the judgment that the extent of such equalization is of ethical relevance. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) argued this explicitly. Let an evaluator adopt a social valuation function whereby the social valuation of recipient i's income in period j is a decreasing function of i's income in period k -that is, the higher is the recipient's income in one year, the lower is the marginal value of a given income amount in the other year. Thus, in the two period case, V = V (y i1 , y i2 ) with V 12 < 0, where y i1 and y i2 are base-year and final-year income respectively. It follows that for given marginal distributions of base-year incomes y 1 = (y 11 , . . . , y n1 )and final-year incomes y 2 = (y 11 , . . . , y n1 ), all social valuation functions of this form would judge that the more equalization of longer-term incomes there is through income mobility, the better the economy is performing. (This is in an analogous sense to judgments made in a cross sectional context to the effect that the more (less) equal is the distribution of single-period income, the better (worse) the economy is doing.)
We thus have an old, clear, well-defined, ethically-relevant concept: income mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes. What I argue in this paper is that although current mobility measures do a good job of measuring other mobility concepts, they do not adequately gauge this one. Thus, in this paper, I develop a class of measures of the concept of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes. This class cannot be derived from any currently-available mobility measure, because it has different axiomatic foundations.
I then apply an easily-implementable member of the new class to U.S. and French data and reach the following principal conclusions. For the United States, the new index shows that labor income mobility equalized longer-term incomes in the 1970s but not in the 1980s and 1990s; this is the first time that this fact has been noted. Also, in the U.S., the time path of mobility-as-an-equalizer-of-longer-term incomes is very different from the time paths of other mobility concepts. Turning to the case of France, in contrast to the United States, income mobility has equalized longer term incomes since the late 1960s.
And unlike the U.S., the time path of mobility-as-an-equalizer-of-longer-term incomes is u-shaped and is matched by u-shaped patterns for other mobility concepts.
Why Equalizing Longer-Term Incomes Is Not the Same as Equalizing Single-Period

Incomes
Equalization of longer-term incomes is a fundamentally different concept from equalization of single-period incomes. To illustrate the difference, suppose we draw samples of two persons from an economy in a base year and a final year and measure the incomes of each person in each of the two years. Assume the data are drawn from comparable cross sections in base and final year but that the people are not the same in the two years (or if they are the same, the surveys do not record who is who). Let the distribution of income in the base year be y 1 = (1, 3), and in the final year, y 2 = (1, 5). In a very straightforward sense, it is clear that the movement from y 1 to y 2 has disequalized single-period incomes.
The limitation of cross-sectional data is that income data are reported for different samples of people , which makes income mobility impossible to study. Suppose instead that the observations y 1 = (1, 3) and y 2 = (1, 5) had come from panel data, so that we can identify which person is which in each survey. Adopt the notational convention of arraying income recipients in an arbitrary order in the base-year distribution, keep these What has happened to the inequality of longer-term incomes in the two cases?
Suppose that we take as our measure of longer-term incomes the average income of each individual over the period in question, as is used in much of the literature on Friedman's permanent income hypothesis. In case I, the distribution of longer-term incomes is L I = (1, 4) and in case II, it is L II = (3, 2).
A straightforward way of gauging whether the underlying mobility processes have equalized or disequalized the distribution of longer-term income in each case is to compare the inequality of L I and L II with the inequality of their common base year income distribution y 1 . For any reasonable concept of inequality, the answer is clear: L I is more unequal than y 1 while L II is more equal than y 1. It is in this sense that case I may be said to illustrate a mobility process that disequalizes longer-term incomes while case II illustrates one that equalizes longer-term incomes. This is the concept of mobility as an equalizer of disequalizer of longer-terms incomes. Given this concept, we need a measure of it. Below, I review how standard measures treat such processes, and upon finding that they do not distinguish well between equalizing and disequalizing processes, I propose a new class of measures that does draw such a distinction.
Equalization or Disequalization of Longer-Term Incomes: Standard Mobility
Measures and the Need for a New One
Suppose that for each of a number of individuals, we have data on base year income y i1 and on final year income y i2 . Income mobility is defined on the vector of (y i1 , y i2 ) pairs.
Imagine the following income mobility process. Starting with a given vector of base-year incomes, suppose that all persons except one keep the same income as before.
The one exception is the richest person in the economy (call him "Gates"), whose income rises by 50%: (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 30000) . By any of the standard definitions of income inequality, this "Gates-gains" process increases inequality.
What do the usual mobility measures say about this process? Most measuresincluding the trace of the quantile transition matrix, the coefficient of rank correlation, the mean number of absolute ranks changed, and many others -would record no mobility in this process. This is because these measures are all based on quantiles of an income transition matrix, none of which change as long as everyone maintains the same rank in the income distribution as before. What these measures measure is positional movement, and they rightly record that there is none of it in the Gates-gains process as long as Gates keeps his #1 position, and all other incomes are unchanged.
What about other mobility concepts in the Gates-gains case? Time-dependence is said to be perfect (or equivalently, time-independence is said to be zero) if all final-year incomes are perfectly predictable from base-year incomes. But because this is not the case when Gates gains, we have a non-zero amount of time-independence. Sharemovement takes place when recipients' income shares change, which is clearly the case here. Income flux arises when somebody's income has changed; that has happened here.
Directional income-movement is positive when someone experiences an income gain, which has also happened. Table 1 Consider what would happen if, instead of Gates gaining 50%, Gates were to lose 50%. Clearly, this should equalize longer-term incomes. Combining this with the judgment just made in the preceding paragraph, any measure of longer-term income equalization should:
Be negative if Gates gets richer, holding other incomes constant.
ii) Be positive if Gates gets poorer, holding other incomes constant.
iii) Equal zero if Gates' and everybody else's incomes are unchanged.
These three conditions are in fact the defining characteristics of an equalization measure when only the richest person's income changes.
The problem is that none of the mobility measures in Table 1 , or the concepts they represent, fulfills these three conditions. The only mobility measure in Table 1 The change in sign has nothing to do with the equalization of longer-term incomes, however. This is because an equalizing process in which a 50% income gain is enjoyed by the poorest person in the economy (100, 200, 20000) → (150, 200, 20000) exhibits the same change in (1/n) Σ (log y 2i -log y 1i ) as a disequalizing process in which the 50% gain accrues to the richest person in the economy. (Cf. the final entries in columns (1) and (3) of Table 1 .) The reason for this is that what (1/n) Σ (log y 2i -log y 1i ) measures is directional income movement gauged in terms of percentage changes, and in both ( We may conclude that the various income mobility measures -even the income movement measures (d) and (e) --do not adequately distinguish between income change processes which equalize longer-term incomes and those which disequalize them. This insensitivity is what motivates the development in this paper of a new class of measuresones that do distinguish between equalizing and disequalizing mobility processes.
Equalization of Longer-Term Incomes versus Equalization of Opportunity
As noted above, Shorrocks (1978) conceptualized income mobility as the degree to which income equalization occurs as the observation period is lengthened. Shorrocks defined rigidity of the income distribution as follows. For the case of T annual observations on income, his rigidity index compares the inequality of T-period incomes with the inequality of single-period incomes. Let y i (t) denote the income of individual i at time t and y t be the vector of such incomes in the population:
y t ≡ (y 1 (t), . . ., y n (t)). Similarly, let y i (T) ≡ y(y i (1), . . . , y i (T)) be a measure of the T-period income of individual i and let y T ≡ (y 1 (T), . . . , y n (T)) be the corresponding vector of such incomes. Shorrocks's rigidity index has in the numerator the inequality of T-period incomes using an inequality measure I(.), and in the denominator a weighted average of the inequality in each year. ,which is the ratio of the mean income in that year to the mean income over T years: Let there be a group of n agents with base-year incomes y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n . Now suppose these agents pool their money and set up a winner-take-all lottery which pays off y 1 + y 2 + . . . + y n to the winner and zero to the losers. Let this be a fair lottery so that each agent has a one-n'th chance of winning. In the Bénabou-Ok sense, establishing such a lottery is equalizing -in fact, perfectly equal -because final year income opportunities are equal ex ante for everyone. However, in the sense to be developed below, the winnertake-all mobility process is disequalizing -in fact, perfectly unequal - If our interest were merely in ordinal comparisons -that is, whether mobility has been equalizing or disequalizing of longer-term incomes --we could choose criteria for inequality comparisons such as Lorenz curve comparisons applied to measures of l and s such as those specified below. Instead, let us proceed to an axiomatic development of cardinal indices of mobility.
The crucial concept in what follows is an equalization function. This function, denoted E l,s = E(I(l), I(s)) tells us how much more or less equal is the distribution of economic well-being in the long-term compared with economic well-being in the shortterm. Of course, it is the nature and extent of economic mobility that determines whether equalization or disequalization takes place over time.
The equalization function is assumed to have the following properties:
E1. Normalization. I(l) = I(s) ⇒ E(.) = 0.
E2. Equalization. I(l) < I(s) ⇒ E(.) > 0.
E3. Disqualization. I(l) > I(s) ⇒ E(.) < 0.
E4. Greater equalization.
a. For two alternative l vectors l 1 , l 2 ∈ L,
b. For two alternative s vectors s 1 , s 2 ∈ S,
E5. Greater disequalization.
The following result is immediate for these five axioms:
Proposition 1: E1 -E5 ⇒ E(I(l), I(s)) is a) decreasing in I(l), b) increasing in I(s), c) equal to zero when I(l) = I(s).
It bears mention that Shorrocks's M index does not satisfy E1-E5. Now let us add a sixth property to E(.) -that if I(l) and I(s) are increased in the same proportion, then E(.) is unchanged:
E6. Homogeneity of degree zero. For all λ > 0, E(λI(l), λI(s)) = E(I(l), I(s)).
Given E6, one may choose λ = 1/I(s) to obtain E(I(l)/I(s), 1) = E(I(l), I(s)), and thus E(I(l)/λI(s), 1) = ϕ (I(l)/I(s)). We then have, for these six axioms:
Proposition 2. E1 -E6 ⇒ E(.) = ϕ (I(l)/I(s)) has the properties listed in Proposition 1.
A corollary of Proposition 2 is:
Proposition 3. The class of equalization measures E ≡ 1 -(I(l) / I(s)) satisfies E1-E6, henceforth termed the E properties.
The class E remains very broad, because it embodies an infinite set of social valuations on the constituent incomes (these valuations are denoted v it (y it )) and an infinite range of inequality measures (denoted by I(.)). The next step is to specify the particular long-term and short-term social valuation functions l and s. For this, I posit the following simplifying properties for operational use:
V1. Discounted summation. Taken over T periods, the long-term valuation l is the annualized discounted sum of the social valuations of its components:
In practice, it will often be the case that the researcher will only have two years of data or will only choose to use the base year and final year incomes, so that in calculating l i , T = 2.
V2. Homogeneity across individuals.
The social valuation function is the same for all individuals: v it (y it ) = v t (y it ) ∀ i.
V3. Homogeneity across time periods.
The social valuation function is the same for all time periods: v it (y it ) = v i (y it ) ∀ t.
V4. Income valuations.
The common social valuation function is income: v it (y it ) = y it ∀ i, t.
An alternative to V4 is:
V4'. Log-income valuations. The common social valuation function is logincome: v it (y it ) = ln(y it ) ∀ i, t.
V5. Non-discounting. Incomes are not discounted, and therefore δ =1.
We then have:
In Proposition 4, p i may be thought of as i's permanent income and s i as i's shortterm income in some single reference year r. In order to specify which single year is to be used, we need:
V6. Base-year reference period. y ir = y i1 ∀ i.
Denote the properties V1 through V6 as the V properties and define p ≡ (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and
. . , s n ). Propositions 3 and 5 then together imply
Proposition 6. The class of equalization measures E ≡ 1 -(I(p) / I(y1)) satisfies the E and V properties.
It remains to specify the properties of the inequality function I(.) which enters into the numerator and denominator of the E class of measures. Let I(.) be defined on an n-vector of incomes. Given a set Z of income vectors and A, B ∈ Z, the binary relations !
(read "at least as unequal as"), ! ("strictly more unequal than"), and ~ ("equally unequal as") provide a basis for comparing their inequalities. We shall assume that I(.) satisfies the Lorenz properties L, viz.
L1. Anonymity.
If A ∈ Z is obtained from B ∈ Z by a permutation of B, A ~ B.
L2. Scale-independence.
If A ∈ Z is obtained from B ∈ Z by multiplying everyone's income by the same positive scalar multiple λ, then A ~ B.
L3. Population-independence.
If A ∈ Z is obtained from B ∈ Z by replicating each income an integral number of times, then A ~ B.
L4. Pigou-Dalton condition.
If, holding all other incomes the same, A ∈ Z is obtained from B ∈ Z by transferring a positive amount of income from a relatively rich person α to a relatively poor person β while keeping α's and β's position in the income distribution the same, then B ! A.
Let I LC (.) denote the class of Lorenz-consistent inequality measures. Then:
Proposition 7. The class of equalization measures E ≡ 1 -(I LC (p) / I LC (y1)) satisfies the E, V, and L properties.
In view of the well-known fact that the Gini coefficient, G(.), is Lorenzconsistent, the following is a corollary to Proposition 7:
Proposition 8. The measure of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes P (for "progressivity"), defined as P ≡ 1 -(G(p) / G(y1)), satisfies the E, V, and L properties.
Applications of the New Equalization Measure
Three applications of the new equalization measure P ≡ 1 -(G(p) / G(y1)) shall be presented here. The first is the application to the hypothetical situations of "Gates gains"
and "Gates loses" presented above. All indices satisfying the E properties, including
, have a threshold value of zero, meaning that positive values signify that longer-term incomes are more equal than base-year incomes, while negative values signify the opposite. For the "Gates gains" mobility process (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 30000), the P index is found to equal -3.9 x 10 -3 , while for the "Gates loses"
process (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 10000), the index takes on the value of 6.6 x 10 -3 . The change in sign clearly shows that the Gates-gains process is disequalizing while the Gates-loses is equalizing.
As a second application, the P index is used to measure the extent to which income mobility has equalized longer-term income in the United States. For each fiveyear period between1970 and 1995, base-year and final-year earnings (including overtime and bonuses) are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. For each panel the sample consists of men aged 25-60 in the base year who were not students, retired, or self-employed, and who had positive earnings in both years. The extent of income mobility may be sensitive to the particular base year and terminal year chosen, so as a robustness check, calculations were made for each period starting and ending a year earlier.
As shown in Table 2 These applications show that in practice as well as in theory, mobility-as-anequalizer-of-longer-term-incomes is fundamentally different from other mobility concepts.
Conclusion
This paper has made six points. First, a well-established concept in the income mobility literature is the notion of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes.
Second, equalization of longer-term incomes is a fundamentally different concept from equalization of single-period incomes. Third, standard mobility concepts and measures are in many cases inconsistent with mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes.
Fourth, mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes is a fundamentally different concept from mobility as an equalizer of opportunity. Fifth, a set of axioms was specified leading to a class of indices of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes, one easily-implementable member of which is the progressivity index P = 1 -(G(p)/G(y 1 ), where G(p) and G(y 1 ) are respectively the Gini coefficient of longer-term income and of base-year income. Finally, in empirical work, the P index was shown to make a fundamental qualitative difference. The new findings here are that income mobility equalized longer-term earnings among U.S. men in the 1970s but not in the 1980s or 1990s, whereas in France, income mobility has always been equalizing since first measured in the late 1960s.
Mobility-as-an-equalizer-of-longer-term-incomes and mobility-as-an equalizer of opportunity are new concepts, complementing mobility-as-time-independence, positional movement, share movement, income flux, and directional income movement. Mobility analysts would do well to be careful to specify which of these concepts are of greatest interest to them and to choose the mobility indices they use accordingly. 1970-1975 .008 1969-1974 .014 1975-1980 .020 1974-1979 .038 1980-1985 -.006 1979-1984 -.015 1985-1990 -.018 1984-1989 -.006 1990-1995 . 1968-1970 0.040 1967-1969 0.040 1973-1975 0.031 1972-1974 0.032 1978-1980 0.030 1977-1979 0.036 1983-1985 0 Source: Buchinsky, Fields, Fougère, and Kramarz (2000) .
* P-Value interpolated from adjacent years due to missing data. 
II. Non-Directional Income Movement
In log-dollars Source: Buchinsky, Fields, Fougère, and Kramarz (2000) .
